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The Protection of Religious Freedom by the National
Constitution and by Human Rights Treaties in the
Republic of Argentina1
Octavio Lo Prete
I. RELIGION IN ARGENTINE SOCIETY
Argentina is a religious society with long-held faith in God. This
religious tradition has been a characteristic of the Argentine people
since the beginning. To this day, nearly two hundred years after the
start of Argentina’s march toward independence, religion continues
to be a crucial part of Argentine life.
A recent study by an accredited scientific organization and
several of the nation’s leading universities is quite revealing on this
matter.2 According to the study, 91.1% of those surveyed said they
“believe in God,”3 and they defined their religious affiliations as
follows: Catholic (76.5%), Evangelical (9%),4 Jehovah’s Witness
1. Work presented at the Fifteenth Annual International Law & Religion Symposium,
hosted by the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, USA;
the theme for the symposium was “International Protection of Religious Freedom: National
Implementation.”
 Founder and former Secretary of the Consejo Argentino para la Libertad Religiosa
(CALIR) [Argentine Council for Religious Liberty] and the Instituto de Derecho Eclesiástico
[Institute of Ecclesiastical Law] at the Catholic University of Argentina. Professor Lo Prete is
also a professor on the Faculties of Law at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) and the
Catholic University of Argentina (UCA).
2. CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS E INVESTIGACIONES LABORALES (CEIL) OF THE CONSEJO
NACIONAL DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTÍFICAS Y TÉCNICAS (CONICET), PRIMERA
ENCUESTA SOBRE CREENCIAS Y ACTITUDES RELIGIOSAS EN ARGENTINA (2008), available at
http://www.culto.gov.ar/encuestareligion.pdf. The University of Buenos Aires, the National
University—Rosario, the National University—Cuyo, and the National University—Santiago
del Estero also participated in the study. The national study included 2403 cases, with a
margin of error of +/- 2% and a 95% confidence level. The survey results were presented on
August 26, 2008, in the Argentine Chancellery (Ministry of Foreign Relations, International
Commerce, and Religion). It must be noted that the last national census which included
information on the religious identities of the Argentine population was taken in 1960.
3. Id. at 4. In the survey, 4.9% responded “no,” meaning that the individual surveyed
did not believe in God, and 4.0% said that they “doubt” or “sometimes believe.” Id.
4. In the survey, 7.9% of those listed as “Evangelical” were defined as “Pentecostal”
and the rest as Baptist, Lutheran, Adventist, or belonging to the “Iglesia Universal del Reino de
Dios” (IURD) [Universal Kingdom of God Church]. Id. at 6.
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(1.2%), Mormon (0.9%), and other religions (1.2%). The remaining
11.3% of respondents claimed to be “indifferent.”5
Despite evidence of the advance of a worldwide culture
encouraging the exclusion of religion from society, or in other
words, one that objects to the public presence of anything related to
a belief in a faith, this study reveals that Argentina remains a religious
society that believes in God.6 The data also support the idea that
Argentina is dominated by a Christian culture, with Jesus at the top
of the “ranking” of beliefs.7 That is, 91.8% of those surveyed claim to
believe “much or somewhat” in Jesus Christ, with 84.8% believing in
the Holy Ghost, 80.1% in the Virgin Mary, 78.2% believing in
angels, 76.2% believing in Saints, and 64.5% believing in energy.8
However, we must note that the survey also reveals the existence
of a complex process of religious deinstitutionalization. This is
confirmed by the fact that more than half of the population says that
they relate to God “without intermediaries,” and also by the fact that
a large majority of the population exhibits a certain discrepancy
between their own conscience and the official doctrine upheld by the
religion to which they claim to belong—especially when it comes to
controversial topics such as abortion, sex education in schools, the
use of contraceptives, and women in the priesthood.9 This religious
deinstitutionalization was highlighted by responses concerning
attendance at religious ceremonies. Of the respondents, 76%
reported that they either “seldom” or “never” visit places of worship,
while only 23.8% said they attend “very frequently.”10
Thus, it is clear that matters of religion can present us with a
complex phenomenon; for example, a person may define him or
herself as belonging to a particular organized religion and say that he
or she frequently attends places of worship, but at the same time
chooses to relate to God “on his or her own terms,” and, on certain
topics, he or she may believe in his or her own conscience and make
decisions contrary to the postulated doctrines of his or her church or
religious community. Such a person might explain it as such: “I

5. Those placed in the “indifferent” category include agnostics, atheists, and those who
do not belong to an organized religion. Id. at 6.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 16.
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belong to a religion and attend worship services, but I go when I
want to, and there are some teachings of my religion that I do not
adhere to.” In short, individuals such as this live their religion “in
their own way.”
Finally, the study concludes with the topic of “public confidence
in institutions.” This is an especially important topic in a country like
Argentina, where the credibility of these institutions, particularly
those in the political sphere, has been weak for many decades. In
general, all of the percentages were low, but it was a religious
institution—the Catholic Church—that had the highest rated
confidence level of those surveyed (59%).11 The remainder of the
institutions on the survey were ranked as follows: media (58%),
Armed Forces (46%), police (42%), legal system (40%), Evangelical
churches (39%), Congress (36%), unions (30%), and lastly, political
parties (27%).12
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
The Constitution of Argentina was first adopted in the year
1853.13 Consistent with Argentina’s religious tradition, this
“theistic” constitution invokes the name of God in its preamble.14
The Constitution’s text also recognizes God’s exclusive dominion
over those private actions of men which in no way offend public
order or morality, nor injure a third party.15 Juan Bautista Alberdi,
the Argentine political theorist whose writings inspired the creators
of the 1853 Constitution, wrote that the invocation of God in the
preamble must be made “not in a mystical sense, but rather in a
profound political sense.”16 A noted modern author, Alfonso
Santiago, explained that this invocation of God “marks the clear
adherence of our Constitution to a theistic and iusnaturalist [natural
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id.
13. Abelardo Levaggi, Constitucionalismo Argentino 1810–1850, IUSHISTORIA No. 2,
Oct. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.salvador.edu.ar/juri/reih/2da/I04.pdf.
14. CONST. ARG. pmbl.
15. CONST. ARG. § 19.
16. JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, BASES Y PUNTOS DE PARTIDA PARA LA ORGANIZACIÓN
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA [BASES AND STARTING POINTS FOR THE POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC] (1852), cited in ALFONSO SANTIAGO,
RELIGIÓN Y POLÍTICA, SUS RELACIONES CON EL ACTUAL MAGISTERIO DE LA IGLESIA
CATÓLICA Y A TRAVÉS DE LA HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINA 240 (Ad-Hoc 2007).
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law] world view.” Stated another way, the invocation to God serves
as “an express acknowledgement of a system of justice that is greater
than this document itself and which forms the basis for all of the
18
positive law in our country.” In Santiago’s view, the “theistic
adherence of the constitution demonstrates also that the Argentine
State is not, nor can be, a totalitarian State that does not recognize
the limits of its actions.”19 Similarly, the Argentine Episcopal
Conference expressed the following:
The explicit reference to God reaffirms our most honored roots
and gives a sense of our Nation’s “self,” which is born and
developed in the faith of the majority. The diverse races and
cultures that make up Argentina find their unity in the faith in a
Supreme Being. Our regime is theistic, not atheist, nor neutral.
Even for the Argentine who does not have faith, religion must be
valued as a part of the culture that makes up our Nation.20

At the same time, in addition to giving special status to the
Catholic Church, to which we will later refer,21 the Constitution also
sets forth the right of every inhabitant, citizen, or foreigner to
“profess freely their religion.”22
This religious tradition continued as the Constitution underwent
its most extensive and important reform in 1994. Among other
things, the 1994 reform reinforced the Constitution’s guarantee to
all to “profess freely their religion” by conferring constitutional
hierarchy “in the full force of their provisions” to relevant human
rights conventions and declarations that govern religious freedom,
expounding upon and clarifying their contents.23 The Constitution
has always mandated that the national government sustain the
Catholic Church.24 It has also always guaranteed religious freedom.25

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. SANTIAGO, supra note 16, at 240.
20. Aporte de la Conferencia Episcopal Argentina para la Reforma de la Constitución
Nacional, Mar. 9, 1994, as quoted in 1 ANUARIO ARGENTINO DE DERECHO CANÓNICO § 3,
at 2 (1994).
21. See infra this Part.
22. CONST. ARG. §§ 14, 20.
23. Id. § 22
24. Id. § 2 (“The Federal Government sustains the Roman Catholic Apostolic
religion.”).
25. Id. at §§ 14 (“All the inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to the following rights .
. . to profess freely their religion.”), 20 (“Foreigners enjoy within the Territory of the Nation
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These sections are not contradictory because the Government can
sustain a church without denying others their religious freedoms.
The 1853 Constitution guaranteed religious freedom even as it
granted special status to the Catholic Church.26 Thus, from the very
beginning, while the Constitution granted to every inhabitant,
citizen, or foreigner the right to “profess freely their religion,”27 it
also stated that “[t]he Federal Government supports the Roman
Catholic Apostolic religion.”28
The question of religion occupied a distinguished place in the
debates prior to ratification of the Constitution of 1853.29 Even
though the delegates to the Constitutional Assembly said they were
“Christians and Democrats” (including some who were Catholic
priests), they still held diverse opinions concerning the position that
the Catholic Church should hold and whether they should recognize
religious freedom.30
At that time, the Catholic religion was professed by almost the
entire population. Declaring Catholicism as the “official” religion
would have thus been a natural choice. However, one of the primary
objectives of the Assembly was to create an Argentina that was open
to immigration,31 which was needed to populate and develop the
nation, and that objective necessitated a guarantee of religious
freedom. Juan Bautista Alberdi considered it to be essential that
European and North American immigrants come to the country, and
many of these were not Catholic. In his work Bases, Alberdi
expressed:
The dilemma is fatal: we can be exclusively Catholic, or we can be
populated and prosper and be tolerant in matters of religion. To
call [to Argentina] the Anglo Saxon race and other populations

all the Civil Rights of citizens; they may . . . practice freely their religion.”), 28 (“The
principles, guarantees[,] and rights recognized in the preceding sections shall not be modified
by the laws that regulate their enforcement.”).
26. The 1994 amendments did not alter the 1853 text regarding the three sections cited
in the previous note.
27. CONST. ARG. § 14; see also id. § 20 (“practice freely their religion”).
28. Id. § 2.
29. A summary of the debate in the Constitutional Assembly of 1853 can be found in
Norberto Padilla, Ciento Cincuenta Años Después, in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LA
ARGENTINA; APORTES PARA UNA LEGISLACIÓN 31–46 (CALIR-KAS 2003), available at
http://www.calir.org.ar/libro/04.pdf, and in SANTIAGO, supra note 16, at 236.
30. Id.
31. See CONST. ARG. § 25.
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from Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, and then deny them the
exercise of their religion is the same as only inviting them on
ceremony, through the hypocrisy of liberalism. This is true to the
letter. To exclude those differing religions from South America is
to exclude the English, Germans, Swiss, and North Americans who
are not Catholic; that is, we would be excluding those settlers that
this continent needs most. To bring them here without their
religion is to bring them here without the agent that makes them
who they are; to make them live without religion; to make them
atheist.32

Due in large part to Alberdi’s arguments, a compromise was
made, which created a synthesis that guaranteed religious freedom to
all33 and granted the Catholic Church special status or supremacy.34
It should be noted, however, that the Church’s position of privilege
was limited by the constitutional establishment of the Patronato,
which subjected the Catholic Church to the civil powers in matters
such as the designation of authorities, communication between the
hierarchy and the faithful, etc.35 The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention understood the Patronato as a legacy of the Spanish
kings, and they judged it appropriate for their national sovereignty.
In 1871, José Manuel Estrada, an opponent of the Patronato and
advocate of the rights of the Church, argued that the religious
freedom of the 1853 Constitution was “contradictory” since it was
full and unlimited for all religions except Catholicism, for which it
was null.36 He added that the Patronato “limits religious freedom,
attacks its principle and annuls it, and the extension of all of this was

32. ALBERDI, supra note 16, at 74, cited in Horacio R. Bermudez, La Libertad Religiosa
en la Constitución Nacional, in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN EL DERECHO ARGENTINO 81–82
(Roberto Bosca & Juan G. Navarro Floria eds., 2007).
33. The policy on open immigration was established not only through the recognition
of freedom of worship, but also through specific regulations that consolidated the idea.
CONST. ARG. §§ 25, 75, ¶ 18). The Preamble itself designates the Constitution “to all men of
the world who wish to dwell on Argentine soil.” Id. at pmbl.
34. Id. § 2.
35. Paul E. Sigmund, Religious Human Rights in Latin America, 10 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 173, 174 (1996) (explaining that under the principle of Patronato the sovereign
maintained the authority to appoint bishops, while the Church was often given a religious and
educational monopoly, as well as large land grants in return).
36. JOSÉ MANUEL ESTRADA, La Iglesia y el Estado, in LA IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO Y OTROS
ENSAYOS POLÍTICOS Y DE CRÍTICA LITERARIA 9, at 36, 41–42 (4th ed. 1945).
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all based on a doctrinal error: the right of the State to legislate in
religious matters.”37
This clause is still in effect today. In 1987, the Argentine
Episcopal Conference proposed that the national government adopt
the following constitutional language from the Province of Córdoba
in order to guarantee freedom to the Catholic Church:
The Argentine Nation, in accordance with its cultural tradition,
recognizes and guarantees to the Apostolic Roman Catholic
Church, the free and public exercise of its worship. The
relationship of this Church and the Federal State is based on the
principles of autonomy and cooperation. It also guarantees free and
public exercise to other religions, with no further limitations than
those prescribed by morals, good customs, and the public order.38

The supremacy clause did not confer upon the Catholic Church
the characteristics of an official State religion. This fact was
emphasized in the 1994 reforms which, for example, removed the
requirements that the president and vice president be Catholic and
that they swear to the Gospel Saints,39 or that they uphold the
obligation mandated by the National Congress to “keep peace with
the Indians, and convert them to Catholicism.”40 In the Villacampa
verdict of 1989, the National Supreme Court of Justice expressed
that:
Articles 2 [and] 67[,] paragraphs 15, 76[,] and 80, of the National
Constitution relate intimately to legislative customs and traditions
of the Argentine people, and also, were a consequence of the rights
that the State exercised through the Patronato, but they do not
mean, however, that the apostolic Roman Catholic religion should
disguise the character of official religion of the State nor that its
religious guidelines should be consecrated in our statutory law.41

37. Id.
38. 1 AADC, APORTE DE LA CONFERENCIA EPISCOPAL ARGENTINA PARA LA REFORMA
DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL 260 (1994).
39. CONST. ARG. § 93 (“On assuming office, the President and Vice-President shall take
oath before the President of the Senate and before Congress assembled, respecting their
religious beliefs, to: ‘perform with loyalty and patriotism the office of President (or VicePresident) of the Nation, and to faithfully observe the Constitution of the Argentine Nation,
and to cause it to be observed.’”).
40. Id. § 67, ¶ 15 (1853), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/
Argentina/arg1853.html#seccionprimeracap3.
41. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 9/2/1989, “Villacampa, Ignacio v. Almos de
Villacampa, María Angélica,” Fallos (1989-312-122) (Arg.).
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Regarding the reference to the “conversion of the Indians to
Catholicism,” the Court used similar language to conclude that “it
was done in order to ensure an adequate integration of these racial
groups into a mostly-Catholic society.”42 The Catholic Church, in
the Report, requested the suppression of section 67, paragraph 15,
due to its being offensive “to the indigenous people, to the Catholic
Church, and also to the National Congress.”43
One of the most important reforms in the 1994 constitution was
the elevation of certain international law documents, incorporating
them into the constitution itself, and consequently granting them
authority equal to the constitution.44 The reform of 1994 reinforced
the guarantee of religious freedom by conferring constitutional
hierarchy “in the full force of their provisions” to key human rights
conventions and declarations that govern religious freedom,
expounding upon and clarifying their contents.45 Article 75, Item 22,
incorporates these international agreements into the Constitution,
and specifically states they are to be understood as complementing
the rights and guarantees to freely profess religion as recognized in
the first part of the founding Constitution and still found in Article
1.46 The 1994 amendment specifically states that the Constitution
and any human rights documents incorporated into it are to be seen
as supportive and explanatory of one another and not as
contradictory.47 Among these are the following United Nations
instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),48
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948),49 the International Convention on the Elimination

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Jason Morgan-Foster, Note, The Relationship of IMF Structural Adjustment
Programs to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited, 24 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 577, 593 (2003) (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 27/12/1996,
“Chocobar Sixto Celestial v. Caja Nacional de Provisión para el Personal del Estado y Servicios
Públicos,” Fallos (1996-319-3241) (Arg.)).
48. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
49. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965),50 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),51 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966),52 and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).53 There is also
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (1979),54 and the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1984).55 The
reforms also allowed other international law documents to be given
constitutional hierarchy if, after a preliminary endorsement by the
Argentine National Congress, they are approved by both branches of
Congress by a two-thirds vote.56 Later, in 2003, the National
Congress exercised this power by elevating the Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity (1969)57 to constitutional hierarchy.58
After incorporation into the Constitution, these instruments can only
be denounced by the National Executive Power “after the approval
of two-thirds of all the members of each House.”59
On a regional level, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (1948),60 the American Convention on Human
Rights—Pact of San José, Costa Rica (1969),61 and the InterAmerican Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons

50. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
51. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
52. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
53. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
54. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
55. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
56. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22; see also Morgan-Foster, supra note 47, at 592–93.
57. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
58. Law No. 24584, Nov. 29, 1995 [28281] B.O. 1.
59. CONST. ARG. § 74, ¶ 22.
60. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82
doc.6 rev.1, at 17 (1992).
61. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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(1994)62 also have constitutional hierarchy.63 The Magna Carta and
other indicated international documents make up what is commonly
referred to as the “bloc of federal constitutionality.”64
In his report after a visit to the country in 2001, United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (“the Report”),
Abdelfattah Amor, expressed his satisfaction at “Argentina’s
accession to most of the international human rights instruments—in
fact all the instruments relating to freedom of religion and belief—
and the fact that it has incorporated them into the Constitution,
with the status that entails.”65
The reforms of 1994 also granted precedence over common laws
to those treaties that don’t enjoy constitutional hierarchy.66 This
means that while treaties not incorporated into the Constitution may
be superseded by the Constitution, absent a constitutional
provision—or positive law from Congress—the unincorporated
treaties are binding on the courts. The following are examples of
universal and regional instruments that have been ratified by
Argentina and supersede the common law: the Geneva Conventions
(1949),67 the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (UNESCO, 1954),68 the
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,69 the Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) Convention,70 the Convention

62. Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, adopted June
9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529.
63. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22; Law No. 24820, May 29, 1997 [28657] B.O. 1; Law No.
23054, Mar. 3, 1984 [25394] B.O. 1.
64. See F. LUCHAIRE, LE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIIONNEL 179–83 (1980).
65. Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Intolerance: Report,
¶ 121, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.1 (Jan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Report].
66. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22.
67. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, ratification by Argentina effective Mar. 18, 1957; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
ratification by Argentina effective Mar. 18, 1957.
68. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, open for signature May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, accession by Argentina effective
June 22, 1989.
69. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320
U.N.T.S. 291, ratification by Argentina effective Jan. 18, 1961.
70. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation,
June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, ratification by Argentina effective June 18, 1969.
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against Discrimination in Education (UNESCO, 1960),71 the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961),72 the Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,73 the Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—“Protocol of San
Salvador”74 (1988), the Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT, 1995),75 the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (1998),76 the Inter-American
Convention against Terrorism (OAS, 2002),77 the Convention for
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO,
2003),78 and the Protocolo Constitutivo del Parlamento del
MERCOSUR (2005) [Protocol Establishing the Parliament of
MERCOSUR].79
Faced with this constitutionally designed scenario, does religious
freedom exist and thrive when the constitutional text itself grants
privileged status to the Catholic Church? The answer clearly is yes.
In particular, as the United Nations Organization has stated, the
connection of privilege between the State and a particular religion is
not “in and of itself” contrary to human rights.80 If, however, that
71. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Nov. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93,
ratification by Argentina effective Jan. 30, 1964.
72. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95,
ratification by Argentina effective Oct. 10, 1963.
73. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 14 Nov. 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231,
ratification by Argentina effective Apr. 11, 1973.
74. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), opened for signature Nov.
17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, ratification by Argentina effective June 30, 2003.
75. Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, opened for signature
June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, ratification by Argentina Feb. 1, 2002.
76. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, ratification by Argentina effective Feb. 8, 2001.
77. Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, June 3, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 19,
ratification by Argentina July 18, 2005.
78. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17,
2003, UNESCO Doc. MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14, ratification by Argentina effective Nov. 9,
2006.
79. PROTOCOLO CONSTITUTIVO DEL PARLAMENTO DEL MERCOSUR, available at
http://www.mercosursocialsolidario.org/images/stories/oficial/documentos/protocolo_con
stitutivo_mercosur.pdf.
80. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 18), U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 209, 210, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Oct. 7, 1993) (“The fact that a
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particular religion were to exploit its privileged status to impinge
upon the rights of other religious communities or to discriminate
against those of another faith, such conduct would be inimical to
human rights.
In Argentina this has not happened. Non-Catholic religions in
Argentina have been able to develop without problems—other than
what is required in order to justify their legal status, as discussed
below—and Argentineans can freely profess their religious beliefs.
Moreover, the reform of 1994 abolished several religious restrictions,
including the requirement that the president of Argentina be
Catholic.81
What all of this means is that, with only a few small exceptions,
Argentina has countenanced no major religious conflicts or
discrimination in more than 150 years of nationhood, including
prejudice of the Catholic Church. Indeed, the special status given to
the Catholic Church under the Constitution does not in and of itself
create a detriment to the rights of other religions, but merely
translates, for example, into the fact that it has public legal personnel
recognized by the Civil Code that have made agreements with the
State (such as the one in 1996 that stripped the Patronato of its
power, and that of 1957, put into effect in 1992, which created the
Military Ordinariate), and which receive direct government financial
subsidies. These concessions themselves do not create a detriment to
the rights of other religions since the Constitution justifiably
regulated the form in which the “question of religion” was asked,
based on historical foundations that justify the different treatment.82
And so the Special Rapporteur, echoing the observations of the
previously-mentioned Committee on Human Rights, said that
“[f]rom the viewpoint of international law and jurisprudence in this

religion is recognized as a State religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that
its followers comprise the majority of the population shall not result in any impairment of the
enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any
discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers.”).
81. See CONST. ARG. §§ 55, 89.
82. For example, the direct financing, as well as being an almost symbolic support that
in definition complies with the constitutional mandate to “sustain the Catholic religion,” also
recognizes historical arguments that are applicable only to the Catholic Church. CONST. ARG.
§ 2; see Octavio Lo Prete, La Financiación Estatal de las Confesiones Religiosas [State Financing
of Religions], in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN ESPAÑA Y ARGENTINA [Religious Freedom in
Spain and Argentina] 271, 285 (Isidoro Martín Sánchez & Juan Navarro Floria eds., 2006).
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field, the status of the Catholic Church as enshrined in the
Constitution is not called into question.”83
Notwithstanding the insubstantial subsidies provided to the
Catholic Church, the Argentine government provides a multitude of
benefits that apply to all religions equally. For example, tax benefits,
which are a much more important and far-reaching mode of
government support for religions, are equally available for all
churches and religious communities. Moreover, other government
subsidies—including access to the media, ability to establish schools
or universities, permission to declare holy days, and permission to
have a religious presence in medical centers and jails—are all freely
available to all religions.
Despite the government’s unflagging support, some nonCatholic religious communities repeatedly have demanded religious
“equality.” On this point, it seems necessary to make a distinction
between the different facets of religious freedom.
On an individual level, basic human dignity demands recognition
of the rights of all people on an even footing, independent of the
religious beliefs they hold. To that end, Argentina’s AntiDiscrimination Law of 1988 established special legal protections
against religiously-motivated acts of discrimination.84 Discrimination
based on religious motivation—for example, having to belong to a
particular religion in order to hold a public office—would not pass
the test of reasonability demanded by the practice of jurisprudence.
The collective or communal body of religious freedom, on the
other hand, takes on an added dimension. Here, the principle of
“absolute” or “arithmetic” equality clearly is incompatible with
liberty and justice.85 This is in line with the concept of “equality”
invariably upheld by Argentina’s National Supreme Court of Justice

83. Report, supra note 65, ¶ 153. The official followed up these comments, however,
by saying that “a number of steps should be taken to ensure wholly equal treatment of all
communities of religion or belief.” Id.
84. Law No. 23592, July 23, 1988 [26458] B.O. 1. The Special Rapporteur reported
that “[t]he legislation which directly or indirectly governs freedom of religion or belief
explicitly or implicitly enshrines the principles of tolerance and non-discrimination, which are
the foundations of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.” Report, supra note 65, ¶ 124.
85. See Juan Navarro Floria, Los Desafíos de la Libertad Religiosa [The Challenges of
Religious Freedom], Presentation at the International Congress “Religious Liberty: Origin of
All Liberties” organized in Buenos Aires by CALIR (Apr. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.calir.org.ar/congreso/documentos/NAVARRO.FLORIA.pdf.
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(which is modeled after the jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court): “equal treatment to equals in equal circumstances.”
That is, Argentina cannot exclude from one that which, in equal
circumstances, is given to others.
But this equality does not mean that religions cannot be
considered differently in different situations, as long as those
distinctions are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Indeed, different legal
treatment is not necessarily discriminatory, nor does it violate
constitutional rights, since factual inequalities sometimes justify
unequal treatment.
Of course, the Argentine government must be very careful and
adequately substantiate different treatment given to different
religions. Recognizing the complexity that this challenge entails,
reasonable points should be sought out so that each religion can be
treated according to what it represents in historical, cultural,
sociological or analogous terms, while avoiding conceding to one
religion that which is denied another religion in similar
circumstances. That is, differential treatment should not be used to
the detriment of the rights of other religious communities or used
for legal discriminations against those who belong to a different
religion.
Finally, this constitutional model has allowed Argentina to be a
model in matters of cultural integration and religious coexistence,
and the dialogues of different religions have been ever more
profound and productive. Argentina is an example to follow based
on the high level of importance given to the development of peaceful
coexistence.
III. THE NATIONAL SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES
Argentina is a signatory to the principle treaties on human rights
which encompass a more extensive protection of religious freedom
than what is established in the Argentine Constitution. It is therefore
necessary to, even in a synthetic way, expound on how the Supreme
Court has interpreted the hierarchal relationship between the treaties
and State law, as well as in what way the jurisprudence of the
enforcing bodies of the international instruments should be received,
especially since 1994, when the most significant human rights
treaties were given constitutional hierarchy.
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It should be noted first that in 1992, the highest Tribunal
determined, in the Ekmekdjian86 verdict, that these treaties prevail
over internal law, a principle that stems from the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which established that a State party “may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty.”87
A. Judicial Treatment of Treaties Pursuant to the Argentine
Constitution
The drafters of the 1994 Constitution incorporated the Vienna
internal law doctrine into the constitutional reforms of 1994, by
prescribing that treaties “have a higher hierarchy than laws.”88
Further, the Article conferred constitutional hierarchy on specific
human rights instruments, which, in effect, created two categories of
treaties: “ordinary” treaties, and those that receive preferential
constitutional treatment.89
While ordinary treaties still rank higher than the law, they are still
subject to the Constitution. Section 27 of the Argentine National
Constitution demands that all treaties be in accordance with the
“principles of public law laid down by [the] Constitution.”90 In
1993, the Supreme Court held that the Vienna Convention grants
priority to the treaties in the case of a conflict with a contrary

86. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 07/07/1992, “Ekmekdijan, Miguel v.
Sofovich,” Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.).
87. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. The Convention was ratified by the Argentine Republic in 1972 and entered into force
on January 27, 1980. Law No. 19865, Oct. 3, 1972, [XXXII-D] A.D.L.A. 6412. The
Supreme Court expressed, in the cited verdict, that the Convention “has altered the situation
of the Argentine legal code” in part because the application of Article 27 “imposes upon
Argentine governmental bodies to assign priority to the treaty in the case of an eventual
conflict with internal laws, or with the omission of dictating provisions that, in their effects,
equate to the failure to fulfill the international treaty according to the terms of the cited Article
27.” Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 07/07/1992, “Ekmekdijan, Miguel v. Sofovich,”
Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.). This last part implies that the verdict acknowledged operability
to the rights encompassed in the international instruments. Ekmekdjian was also relevant
because it advanced a criterion later developed, by establishing that the interpretation of the
Covenant be guided by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Id.
88. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22.
89. The Argentine National Constitution refers to these treaties as having a
“constitutional hierarchy.” Id.
90. CONST. ARG. § 27.
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internal law, as long as they are in accordance with the constitutional
“principles of public law.”91
Certain human rights treaties are specifically mentioned in the
seventy-fifth section of the Argentine National Constitution and
receive a higher status in the Argentine legal hierarchy than ordinary
law (“Section 75 treaties”).92 The language of the Constitution,
however, has led to various interpretive difficulties, because while the
Constitution ratified these specific treaties “in the full force of their
provisions,” it also provides that the treaties “do not repeal any
section of the First Part of this Constitution” and that they “are to
be understood as complementing the rights and guarantees
recognized [t]herein.”93
Logically, the interaction of such precepts is decisive when trying
to determine the scope of the treaties, and of the rights that are
encompassed in them, so that we can definitively know (1) the
relationship between Section 75 treaties and the Constitution itself,
and (2) the value that should be assigned to the body of law
stemming from the organizations and tribunals established by these
treaties.
1. Applying the protections of the Section 75 treaties
Initially, we encounter the question of how to resolve possible
conflicts of rights; that is, which has supremacy: the Section 75
treaties or the Constitution? The majority of courts give treaties that
have constitutional hierarchy the same deference as the Constitution.
And while there is an influential minority view that Section 75

91. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/7/1993, “Fibraca Constructora SCA. v.
Comisión Técnica Mixta de Salto Grande,” Fallos (1993-316-1669) (Arg.).
92. See CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22. The Paragraph specifically mentions the following
treaties: “The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the International
Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact on Civil and Political
Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide; the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women; the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments
or Punishments; [and] the Convention of the Rights of the Child . . . .” Id.
93. Id. Law 24.309, which declared the need for constitutional reform, established in
Article 7 that the Constitutional Convention could not “introduce any modification to the
Declarations, Rights and Guarantees contained in Chapter One of the First Part of the
National Constitution.” Law No. 24309, Dec. 29, 1993, [1994-A] A.D.L.A. at 1.
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treaties do not receive constitutional deference, as a whole,
Argentine law is shifting away from that approach.
a. Minority view. Judge Belluscio, in the Petric ruling, indicated
that the treaties mentioned in Article 75, Paragraph 22, make up
constitutional rules of second rank; they prevail over ordinary laws,
but are valid only to the extent in which they do not affect the rights
enshrined in the First Part of the Constitution.94 This doctrine was
reiterated in the Aranciba Clavel case.95 In that ruling, Judge Fayt
alluded to the categorization of the treaties listed in Article 75,
Paragraph 22, as “second rank,” demanding an unavoidable
verification of their agreement with those rights and guarantees
which the Court, in its custody and final interpretation of the
Constitution, has the right to safeguard.96
b. Majority view. While there have been votes for giving the
Constitution superiority over treaties, the majority of judges have
interpreted the formula used by the Constituent Assembly of 1994
as a definitive judgment on the compatibility between treaties and
the Constitution that cannot be judicially revised. Thus, it is the
function of the Judicial Power, in every concrete case, to harmonize
the applicable provisions of a preferential treaty with those of the
Constitution.97
Paragraph 22 of Section 75 states that the treaties “are to be
understood as complementing the rights and guarantees recognized”
by the Constitution.98 This complementary nature has been
understood as a plus that gives the declarations an internal order,
with either the Constitution or the treaties prevailing, depending on
whichever gives the greatest protection.99 The Supreme Court
reiterated this point in Monges, stipulating that “the constitutional

94. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 16/4/1998, “Petric, Domagoj Antonio c/
diario,” Fallos (1998-321-885) (Arg.).
95. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, “Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro
y otros,” Fallos (2004-327-3294) (Arg.).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 29/9/1998, “Cancela,” Fallos (1998321-2637) (Arg.); Courte Supreme de Justicia [CSJN], 27/12/1996, “Chocobar, Sixto
Celestial v. Caja Nacional de Provisión para el Personal del Estado y Servicios Públicos,” Fallos
(1996-319-3241) (Arg.).
98. CONST. ARG. § 75, ¶ 22.
99. Gelli, María Angélica, Constitución de la Nación Argentina, Comentada y
Concordada [Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Commentary and Agreements], in 2 LA
LEY 227 (4th ed. expanded 2008).
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clauses and those of the treaties have the same hierarchy, are
complementary, and therefore, cannot displace or destroy the
other.”100
Further, the constitutional phrase, “in the full force of their
provisions” has been interpreted to mean not only the method by
which the treaties were approved and ratified by the Republic of
Argentina (i.e., the requirement that a treaty is not to be ratified
with a reservation that is “incompatible with the object and purpose
of the treaty”),101 but also the interpretive reach given to the clauses
of the treaty by the international legal system.102
B. Effect of Decisions by International Courts on Argentine
Jurisprudence
Although the courts uphold the provisions found in preferential
treaties, there is still the question of how to treat decisions that are
not found directly in the treaty but are made by a body created by
the treaty; that is, if a preferential treaty either creates an
international court or authorizes an existing international court to
hear a relevant case, what deference, if any, do the Argentine Courts
give to those decisions?
Five of the ten listed Section 75 treaties explicitly authorize an
international court to try disputes resulting from a breach of the
applicable treaty. The American Convention on Human Rights
created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.103 The other

100. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 26/12/1996, “Monges, Analía M. v.
Universidad de Buenos Aires,” Fallos (1996-319-3148) (Arg.).
101. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (stating that a reservation may not strip a treaty of its original purpose). Argentina has
approved, with reservations and/or declarations, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the American Convention on Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. See Law No. 6286/56, Apr. 9, 1956, [XVI-A] A.D.L.A. 273; Law No. 23054, Mar. 1,
1984, [25394] B.O. 1; Law No. 23313, Apr. 17, 1986, [25928] B.O. 1; Law No.23849,
Sept. 27, 1990, [26993] B.O. 1.
102. Gelli, supra note 99, at 221.
103. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 33, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (“The following [organizations] shall have competence with respect to matters relating to
the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to this Convention: . . . [t]he
Inter-American Court of Human Rights . . . .”).
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four pertinent treaties authorize the International Court of Justice to
hear disputes.104
1. Judicial decisions promulgated by international courts
In the Giroldi ruling in 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that the
constitutional hierarchy of the American Convention on Human
Rights was established by the express will of the Constituent
Assembly in the full force of its provisions; “that the Convention is
valid in the international sphere and particularly considering its
effective legal application by the international courts through their
interpretation and application.”105
When Argentina approved the American Convention on Human
Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica) in 1984, it recognized “the
competence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and on the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights . . . for an indeterminate period and on condition of
reciprocity on all cases related to the interpretation or application of
104. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 30, ¶ 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Any
dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them,
be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration
the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties
may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the
Statute of the Court.”); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, art. 29, ¶ 1, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.13 (“Any
dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation of application of the
present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the
parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute
of the Court.”); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 22, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (“Any dispute
between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this
Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in
this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the
International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of
settlement.”); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art.
9, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (“Disputes between the Contracting
Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other of
the acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at
the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”).
105. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/4/1995, “Giroldi, Horacio David y otro /
recurso de casación,” Fallos (1995-318-514) (Arg.) (emphasis added).
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the Convention cited.”106 The Giroldi ruling agreed with this
interpretation pointing out that “the cited jurisprudence should
serve as a guide for the interpretation of the convention precepts in
the manner in which the Argentine State recognizes the competence
of the Inter-American court in all cases relative to its interpretation
and application of the American Convention.”107
In Arancibia Clavel, Judge Boggiano reiterated this deferential
doctrine by holding that the treaties “must be applied in Argentina
just like they function in the international sphere, including the
international jurisprudence relative to those treaties and the rules of
customary international law as complemented by the pertinent
international practice,” adding in his vote that the signatory
countries, among them Argentina, “have greatly reduced the scope
of their respective internal jurisprudence by way of agreement with
many treaties and declarations on human rights and by participating
in the formation of a delineated body of international customary law
regarding human rights.”108
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Argentina clarified the
international doctrine: “[T]he Judiciary . . . must exercise a type of
‘conventionality control’ between the domestic legal provisions,
applied to specific cases, and the American Convention on Human
Rights,” and the Court must keep in mind “not only the treaty, but
also the interpretation of the same as made by the Inter-American
Court, the highest interpreter of the American Convention.”109
2. Advisory opinions issued by international administrative bodies
While courts must give deference to applicable international
courts, there is still the question of how to treat promulgations made
by international administrative bodies. The Supreme Court, in their
Bramajo ruling, stated that the advisory opinions and
recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights must also serve as an “interpretation guide” for the precepts

106. Law No. 23054, Mar. 19, 1984, [25394] B.O. 1.
107. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/4/1995, “Giroldi, Horacio David y otro /
recurso de casación,” Fallos (1995-318-514) (Arg.).
108. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/8/2004, “Arancibia Clavel, Enrique Lautaro
y otros,” Fallos (2004-327-3294) (Arg.).
109. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 13/7/2007, “Mazzeo, Julio Lilo y otros,”
Fallos (2007-330-3248) (Arg.).
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of the American Convention.110 Two years later, however, the Court
limited the reach of advisory opinions, indicating that while the State
must make all necessary efforts to give a favorable response to the
Commission’s recommendations, “this is not equivalent to
establishing as a must that judges give compliance to its content by
not dealing with decisions that are reserved for the Judiciary.”111
In summary, the Argentine legal system is going through a
period of redefinitions and transformations. The generally expressed
characteristics show that the National Supreme Court of Justice has
set out in recent years on a path towards the functionality and
obligations of international law governing human rights, clearing up
the interpretations made by the respective enforcing bodies,
principally the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND CHALLENGES
The status of religious freedom, as guaranteed by Argentine law,
is, in general terms, highly satisfactory.112 Religions can perform their
work without inconveniences and we see very few cases of
discrimination based on religion. Those few cases that have surfaced
have been isolated cases and in the majority of cases have been
satisfactorily resolved.
In the previously-mentioned report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur
underlined that not only do the “federal and provincial
constitutional provisions guarantee freedom of religion and belief
and freedom to manifest religion or belief in accordance with
relevant international law,” but also that, in general terms,
“Argentine legislation furnishes solid constitutional foundations and
important legal guidelines to guarantee freedom of religions and
belief,” and that “the State’s policy generally embodies respect for
freedom of religion or belief and freedom to manifest religion or

110. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 12/9/1996, “Bramajo, Hernan de Javier,”
Fallos (1996-319-1840) (Arg.).
111. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 22/12/1998, “Acosta, Claudia Beatriz y otros,”
Fallos (1998-321-3555) (Arg.).
112. We should remember that in 1989, the Supreme Court, in partially allowing a case
of conscientious objection to obligatory military service, demonstrated that religious freedom is
“particularly valuable” and that humanity has achieved it “thanks to many efforts and
tribulations” (Consideration 8, Majority Vote). See Rulings 312:496 (Law 1989-C, 405; The
Law 133:365).
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belief, in keeping with international human rights standards in this
field.”113
Argentina has ratified the principle international instruments that
protect and prescribe the scope of religious freedom, and has even
given them a substantial elevation by granting them constitution
hierarchy in the reform of 1994.114 Adding to this is the
interpretative path which the Supreme Court has been treading,
which has been favorable to the reception of the opinion and
jurisprudence that the transnational courts and organizations carry
out in the application of treaties.
In any case, we understand that in order to further the validity of
religious freedom, we must face the following challenges:
Sanctioning a law that will set forth the standards of religious
freedom in their widest interpretation possible, extended to both
individuals and religious communities, and granting at the same time
to non-Catholic religions a legal status more in line with their own
uniqueness.115
Consolidating policies in order to increase the understanding and
importance given to religious freedom as a fundamental right,
especially in education.116

113. See Report, supra note 65, ¶¶ 118, 128, 130. The Rapporteur added in this last
point that, “[t]he authorities permit the practice of religion, the construction of places of
worship, religious education and, in fact, apart from special situations and cases, the expression
of all manifestations of freedom of religion.” He goes on to say that “the State grants public
funds to a variety of religious communities, but the predominant Catholic Church and
religious minorities,” and that, “[i]n general, the State does not interfere in the internal affairs
of communities of religion and belief,” and that “[i]t is very active in dialogue and cooperation
with religious communities.” Id. ¶ 130.
114. This reform also struck down the requirement that the president be Catholic, and
eliminated all of the regulations of the Patronato (which had not been in effect since the
Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Holy See in 1966) and gave way to the
consolidation of the principle of non-discrimination, establishing that the swearing in of the
president and vice-president be performed according to their own religious beliefs. CONST.
ARG. § 93.
115. At the time of this writing, the Secretary of Worship is elaborating on a new draft
legislation that will incorporate previous proposals, among them the draft bill by the Argentine
Council on Religious Freedom (CALIR).
116. Take, for example, the “inter-religious pledge of allegiance to the flag” that every
year reunites students from public schools and private schools (both religious and lay), with the
objective of strengthening the values of peaceful coexistence. The initiative, created by the
Institute for Inter-Religious Dialogue and the Christian Youth Association, together with the
Secretary of Worship, is complemented by various activities held in the separate schools with
parents, docents, and students. See Press Release, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Comercio Internacional y Culto (Arg.), Press Release No. 225/07 (on file with author).
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Authoring cooperative agreements between the State and various
religious entities on matters of mutual interest.
Protecting, including through reforms of penal legislation,
religious feelings from offense or ridicule of sacred dogmas, things or
places.
Expanding the recognition of the right to conscientious
objection, and extending its scope.
Condemning expressions that seek to nullify the opinion of, or
even reject the public participation of, religions in matters of
common interest.
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